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In 2013 Bulgaria was shaken by two waves of mass protests, which seemed to mobilise distinct social 
groups and put different, and often conflicting, demands on the table. In the midst of the turbulence of 
the protests, new political formations emerged, which aimed to capitalize on the mobilizations. The 
mushrooming of new political projects in the wake of the mass protests seems to mark an apparent re-
politicization following the post-political turn after 1989. Yet the language and identities of these new 
civic and party formations point to a more complicated dynamic between civic movements, political 
parties, and the state. 'UDZLQJ RQ *UDPVFL¶V WKHRU\ RI KHJHPRQ\ Whis paper scrutinizes the links 
between the newly emerged political projects and the civic mobilizations of 2013 to unravel the new 
social cleavages underpinning them and consider how these are played out in a context of a changed 
relationship between civil society and party politics twenty-five years after the fall of the socialist regime 
in Bulgaria. 
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Bulgaria saw two waves of mass protests in 2013 ± one in February-March and one which started in 
June and lasted a yeari. The two waves appeared different ± mobilising distinct social groups and making 
divergent, and often conflicting, demands of power-holders. What is more, at the same time as both 
contending a wide circle of elites, the two protest waves seemed to engage in a contentious struggle 
between each other. During and in the aftermath of the protests, several new political formations 
emerged, all of which attempted to capitalize on the protest mobilizations. These new political actors 
are particularly interesting as they aimed to specifically address some protesting JURXSV¶JULHYDQFHVDQG
distance themselves from others. Some looked to represent the voice of the discontented crowds of the 
Winter mobilization; others presented themselves as the political formations expressing specifically the 
grievances and demands of the Summer anti-governmental protesters. This apparent mushrooming of 
new political projects seemed to signal the dissolution of the post-VRFLDOLVWWUDQVLWLRQ¶Vliberal consensus, 
beckoning an apparent re-politicization. Yet the language and identities of these new civic and party 
formations flag a more complicated dynamic between civic movements, political parties, and the state, 
reflecting changed social divisions twenty-five years after the collapse of the socialist regime. The 
V¶anti-totalitarian VORJDQµFLYLOVRFLHW\DJDLQVWWKHVWDWH¶KDVFOHDUO\JLYHQZD\WRDGLIIHUHQWNLQG
of struggle in the context of a liberal democratic institutional arrangement. 
This paperii aims to examine the intersection between the contentious mobilizations of February and 
Summer 2013, and the newly-formed political parties. Reflecting the contentious nature of the struggles 
on both the terrains of civil society and party politics, as well as reflecting the very language protesters 
and political parties used ± central to which was the discourse of µFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ ± the analysis will utilize 
                                                          
i For purposes of brevity, I will refer to the former as the Winter or February protest, and to the latter as the 
Summer protest. 
ii The findings presented in this paper draw on a PhD research project which applied Critical Discourse Analysis 
ƚŽƵůŐĂƌŝĂ ?ƐƉƌŽƚĞƐƚƐŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? 
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WKH H[SODQDWRU\ SRWHQWLDO RI *UDPVFL¶V theory of hegemony. The latter has tremendous potential to 
capture precisely the dynamic interaction both within civil society (potentially apprehending the 
contentious intra-relationships within it), and between civil society and formal politics (since the idea 
of hegemony ZDVFRQFHLYHGDV³DWHFKQLTXH of SROLWLFDOUXOH´>5LOH\@ by consent, established 
through the structures of civil society). Below I first offer a brief DFFRXQW RI *UDPVFL¶V WKHRU\ RI
hegemony as used in this paper; I then conduct a succinct analysis of the two protest waves of 2013 and 
an overview of the four main political projects which emerged either in the course of, or in the aftermath 
of the mobilizationsi. I then offer a Gramscian interpretation of the intersection between the two. 
&LYLOVRFLHW\DQGWKHVWDWH*UDPVFL¶VWKHRU\RIKHJHPRQ\ 
For Gramsci, hegemony is a form of moral and intellectual leadership, whereby the wider population 
understands their own interests as being fundamentally compatible with the hegemonic social group 
(see e.g. Buttgieg 1995), which grants them the legitimacy to hold state power. But it is only once a 
certain way of thinking and seeing the world has acquired hegemonic character in civil society, that a 
political project built on it can become hegemonic, that is become a political project that claims social, 
cultural and economic leadership (see also Thomas 2013: 26-7). The success of a social group in 
acquiring and maintaining stable control over the modern state then depends on its influence over civil 
VRFLHW\ *UDPVFL¶V FLYLO VRFLHW\ can thus be defined as a terrain of social (class) struggle between 
different groups vying for state power.  
'XULQJ SHULRGV RI VWDEOH RU µQRUPDO¶ SROLWLFV state power is not open to contestation, but only 
government is (Riley 2011): SROLWLFDO VWUXJJOHV XQIROG RQ D ³OHJDO WHUUDLQ´ *UDPVFL   ± 
through elections and in parliament, whilst maintaining bureaucratic continuity. Unlike in times of 
normal politics, durLQJSHULRGVRIµRUJDQLFFULVHV¶ political movements with competing visions of the 
state clash, effectively challenging the core of state power, i.e. WKHEXUHDXFUDWLF³FDVWH´*UDPVFL
246). The variable at the heart of this distinction EHWZHHQ µQRUPDO¶ DQG µUHYROXWLRQDU\¶ SROLWLFV
(Adamson 1980: 627-8) LV WKH UHODWLYH VWUHQJWKRI WKHGRPLQDQW FODVV¶KHJHPRQ\  To describe the 
struggles during such organic crises, Gramsci uses WKHPLOLWDU\WHUPVµZDURIPDQRHXYUH¶DQGµZDURI
SRVLWLRQ¶7KHILUVWKHGHILQHV as a frontal attack on state power, and the second ± as comprising political 
processes in preparation for the war of manoeuvre, which amount to a sort of cultural/intellectual 
VWUXJJOH ZKHUH RQH FODVV SXUVXHV KHJHPRQ\ E\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ LWV RZQ µFRPPRQ VHQVH¶ RYHU RWKHU
contenders for hegemony.  
A Gramscian lens on the political dynamics in 2013 in Bulgaria can help us see the protest mobilizations 
of 2013 not only as a struggle against power-holders (since grievances were directed at the political and 
economic elites, who are perceived as opportunistic and corrupt), but also as hegemonic struggles 
between different social groups on the arena of civil society, for the reconstitution of civil society, i.e. 
as part of a Gramscian positional warfare. I argue that at the root of the peculiar divisions and contention 
between different protesting groups which transpired in 2013 was the struggle to occupy strategic 
                                                          
i Methodologically, I focus on the discourses of both the protest movements and the new political formations; 
and I follow the Critical Discourse Analysis approach developed by Norman Fairclough (1992) (who himself draws 
ŚĞĂǀŝůǇŽŶ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ?ƐĂƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
discursive and extra-discursive elements which serve to advance the interests of particular social groups (at the 
expense of others). The overarching critical question which guides my discourse analysis is how contexts of 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǀĂůƵĞƐĂŶĚŐŽĂůƐĂƌĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶĂŶĚƐŚĂƉĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ
broad socio-political struggles. My objective is to identify, through discourse analysis, the particular semiotic 
and extra-semiotic features of the social cleavages which transpired in 2013, and their implications for politics 




strongholds within civil society which would grant the victorious social group the legitimacy to launch 
DµZDURIPDQRHXYUH¶IRU state power. The emergence of new political parties described later in this 
paper then can be seen as opportunistic attempts to prepare the ground for manoeuvring warfare by 
capitalising on the positioning class struggles within civil societyi.  
A critical role in these processes was played by intellectuals. The significance of this group here is 
twofold: theoretically, Gramsci put them at the heart of political (class) struggles at the intersection 
between civil society and politics proper; empirically, they have played a decades-long key role in 
politics in Bulgaria (and Central and Eastern Europe generally) (see Hristova 2007, 2011; Bozoki 1999; 
Eyal, Szeleny and Townsley 2000). )RU *UDPVFL LW LV WKH LQWHOOHFWXDOV¶ function to help provide 
legitimacy for the hegemonic project of the day, and thus for the dominant social group advancing it. 
Intellectuals achieve this by organising the practical content of hegemony and manufacturing consent 
for it, in this way forging the dominant clasVHV¶LQWHUHVWVLQWRZKDW*UDPVFLFDOOHGWKHµFRPPRQVHQVH¶. 
As we shall see, the socio-symbolic power of intellectuals to formulate moral ends, to define the terms 
of the distribution of status and prestige, and to (de)legitimise political action, transpired as particularly 
potent in Bulgaria during both the Winter and the Summer protests of 2013. 
Protest mobilizations of 2013 
The protests of 2013 were probably the most wide-spread protest mobilizations in Bulgaria since 1990. 
The first wave in February started over abnormally high electricity bills. Protesters rallied behind 
slogans calling for the nationalisation of the foreign-owned energy companies, whom they blamed for 
the price hike, as well as behind slogans for DQ µHQG¶ WRSRYHUW\XQHPSOR\PHQWand low pay. The 
mobilization also called for the abolition of political representation and political parties, whom they 
EODPHGIRUµEHWUD\LQJ¶WKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHSHRSOHDQGGHPDQGHGUDGLFDOFKDQJHVWRWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHP
in favour of a more direct form of democracy. Many declared that they no longer believed in political 
SDUWLHVDQGGHVLUHGWRµWDNHSRZHULQWRWKHLURZQKDQGV¶6ORJDQVDORQJWKHVHOLQHVLQFOXGHGµNo To 
3DUWLHVDQG>1R@7R0RQRSROLHV¶µ'RZQ*R7KH0DILD3RZHU,Q&LWL]HQV¶>KDQGV@¶DQG µEnd to the 
Illusions. Self-JRYHUQDQFH $FWLYHQHVV (YHU\ 'D\¶. Protesters also organised horizontally structured 
µFLWL]HQ FRXQFLOV¶ and initiated grassroots drafting of a new constitution which would reflect their 
demands for political system changes. The SURWHVW¶VODQJXDJHZDVUHYROXWLRQDU\HPRWLRQDOO\FKDUJHG
and often conspiracy obsessed; grievances were also often articulated in nationalistic terms. In general, 
we can think of this protest as a radical democratic intervention by subaltern groups, who rejected 
political mediation (parties) and articulated a notion of civil society that overlaps with the notion of µWKH
SHRSOH¶DµSHRSOH¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ (see Tsoneva and Medarov, 2014).  
Interestingly, what many of the revolutionary manifestos which flooded the Bulgarian public sphere in 
February seemed to share was the demand to replace politicians (or political representatives) with 
citizens. Many of the placards which were raised in the streets also echoed this, for exampleµIt is the 
FLWL]HQV¶QRWWKHSDUWLHV¶SURWHVW¶. Some of the most commonly reiterated phrases on the protest were 
µDQWL-FRUUXSWLRQ¶µDQWL-PRQRSROLHV¶µFLYLOVRFLHW\¶µWUDQVSDUHQF\¶DQG µUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶7KHVHDUHRf 
course key liberal signifiers; yet they spearheaded demands for nationalisation of energy companies and 
abolition of representative democracy. Central liberal notions then textured a populist (in the sense of 
anti-elitist) discourse: one which dichotomises the social order into them (politicians/mafia/power-
holders) versus us (µWKH SHRSOH¶, but which at the same time articulates a conspicuously liberal ± 
responsible, active, alert (who keeps political power in check) ± civic subjectivity. In other words, 
articulaWLQJ WKHPVHOYHV DV µFLWL]HQV¶ DORQJ ZLWK µWKH SHRSOH¶ DQG FDOOLQJ IRU µDFWLYHQHVV¶ DQG
µUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶HYHU\GD\SURWHVWHUVattempted to re-VWDNHDFODLPRQ WKHFRQFHSWRI µFLYLO VRFLHW\¶
                                                          
i However, this paper will mostly focus on the positioning warfare observed in 2013 (that is, on the relationship 
between the protest mobilizations and the new political parties.  
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taking it away from its post-1989 carriers ± mostly NGO µH[SHUWV¶ (Tsoneva and Medarov, 2014), and 
µEDFN¶LQWRSHRSOH¶VKDQGVZKHUHLWEHORQJV.  
Thus, tKH)HEUXDU\SURWHVW¶VFRPELQDWLRQRIFRQVSLUDF\QDUUDWLYHVUHYROXWLRQDU\UKHWRULFDQGµFLWL]HQ-
patrioW¶ LGHQWLWLHV SURGXFHG DQ internally-contradicting and fragmented, often radically inclusionary 
(when they demanded direct democracy) but sometimes exclusionary (when they spoke in nationalistic 
terms) articulation of a new political subjectivity which attempted a counter-hegemonic intervention 
twenty-three yeDUV DIWHU µWKH HQG RI KLVWRU\¶ This new subaltern subject challenged tKH WUDQVLWLRQ¶V 
liberal consensus which had been attempted by an alliance of the political and intellectual elites of the 
µWUDQVLWLRQ¶%RWKWKHFRQVHQVXV¶economic pillars, i.e. liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, and 
its political pillar, i.e. representative democracy, got contested as part of a collective bottom-up political 
intervention for the first time.  
7KHµSRSXOLVW¶protest of the subalterns of Winter 2013 then seemed to threaten to shake the dominant 
identity discourse of the transition ± one that was linked to a capitalist narrative of future progress. Many 
of the intellectualsi who spent the last two decades procuring public consent for the liberal-capitalist 
consensus saw the protest as too irrational (anti-capitalist), too nationalist and too conspiracy-obsessed, 
as well as well as dangerously ³EDFNZDUGORRNLQJ´LQFOuding nostalgic of the socialist period). They 
dismissed it as a protest that ³VRXJKW VRFLDOSULYLOHJHV UDWKHU WKDQULJKWV´ (Genov 2013) and thus as 
µSRSXOLVW¶µQRVWDOJLFRIFRPPXQLVP¶DQGµLUUDWLRQDO¶. They saw the February demands as ranging from 
WKH ³XQZLVH´ DQG ³DEVXUG´ WR ³WKH FDWDVWURSKLFDOO\ KDUPIXO´ DQG ³IDQWDVPDJRULF´ (Stanchev 2013; 
Bakalov 2013). To these intellectuals, it seemed to pose a threat to the modernization (Europeanization) 
and de-FRPPXQL]DWLRQSURMHFWVZKLFKXQGHUSLQQHGWKHDJHQGDRIWKHµWUDQVLWLRQ¶ (and which seemed to 
boast much greater consolidating power during the 1990s).  
The February protests resulted in the resignation of the centre-right government (GERB). Interim 
elections held in May produced an opposition-led coalition government composed of the Bulgarian 
Socialist Partyii (BSP) ± successors of the Bulgarian Communist Party (in government 1944±1990) ± 
and the liberal Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) ± informally known as the party representing 
%XOJDULD¶V7XUNLVKPLQRULW\-XVWDPRQWKLQWRLWVPDQGDWHWKHQHZJRYHUQPHQWPDGHDYHU\infamous 
decision to propose Delyan Peevksi, a controversial figure widely suspected of corruption on an 
extraordinary scale, for the position of chief of the State Agency for National Security (DANS). This 
triggered a wide reaction of moral indignation and, once again, people took to the streets. Tens of 
thousands marched daily to protest the controversial appointment, and to challenge what many perceived 
DVµFRDOHVFHQFHEHWZHHQSROLWLFLDQVDQGPDILD¶LQWKHFRXQWU\$OWKRXJKWKHJRYHUQPHQWZDVTXLFNWR
repeal the infamous appointment within days, the protests persisted (though predominantly in the capital 
Sofia) demanding the immediate resignation of the new government which had now lost its credence in 
the eyes of many.  
The SXPPHUSURWHVW¶VFHQWUDOGHPDQG± for resignation ± was accompanied by calls for µPRUDOLW\LQ
SROLWLFV¶µDXWKHQWLFH[SHUWV¶DQGµ(XURSHDQQRUPDOF\¶. It displayed clear pro-EU attitudes and imagined 
LWVHOIDV³belonging to DXWKHQWLFFLYLOVRFLHW\´iii. It was also consistently anti-communist (directed at the 
%63 VLQFH WKH µIDLOXUHV RI WKH WUDQVLWLRQ¶ ZHUH DWWULEXWHG WR µcommunist remainders¶ in post-1989 
                                                          
i These can be thought of as the  ‘organic intellectuals ? ?'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ? of the liberal-capitalist vision for the post-
1989 transformation 
ii BSP tends to be socialist only in name and partly rhetoric, since in their policies (and often in rhetoric) they 
have consistently followed the line of the liberal-capitalist consensus. 
iii At the same time, some of its language was conspicuously illiberal, comprising anti-Turkish chants (since 
Peevski is a member of the Turkish-minority MRF party), which contradicted their self-proclaimed liberal 




amount of original and creative imagery. Many of the intellectuals RIWKHµWUDQVLWLRQ¶who were overtly 
critical of the Winter protests, now saw in the Summer protest liberal and pro-Western (EU) leanings 
and began to use the liberal media to HPSKDVLVHZKDWWKH\VDZDVWKHODWWHU¶V µKLJKFXOWXUH¶HYHQWXDOO\
framing it as the protest of the moral, productive and creative, tax- (and bills-) paying, and even 
³EHDXWLIXO´middle-class, which they pinned as WKHDXWKHQWLFFDUULHURIWKHORQJFRYHWHGµFLYLOVRFLHW\¶
which would finally purge the µcommunist¶ UHPDLQGHUV DQG ILQLVK WKH µLQFRPSOHWH WUDQVLWLRQ¶ WR
(XURSHDQµQRUPDOF\¶7KHIUDPHZDVTXLFNO\SLFNHGup by many of the protesters themselves. In forging 
this identity, some intellectuals, activists, and media outlets conceitedly declared that this protest is 
different from the Winter one, claiming that it was the poor and desperate µPREV¶ZKRSURWHVWHG LQ 
)HEUXDU\ZKLOHQRZWKHµPLGGOHFODVVHV¶ZHUHPDUFKLQJQRWIRUPDWHULDOWULYLDOLWLHVVXFKDVELOOVEXW
IRU µYDOXHV¶DJDLQVW WKH FRUUXSWSROLWLFDO HOLWHVii. What is more, they claimed that if the former were 
nostalgic of communism and prone to populism, the latter were rational enough to know that free market 
capitalism (and austerity politics) is the way forward. Despite the daily protests, the government stayed 
in power for a year and finally resigned in July 2014, putting an end to this second wave of street protests. 
New interim elections were then held in October 2014 which produced a government coalition between 
GERB, the Reform Block (the new formation mentioned earlier), WKHQDWLRQDOLVWµ3DWULRWLF)URQW¶, and 
the centre-left ABViii.  
The elitist discourse of the Summer protest then can be seen as an attempt to re-assert the hegemonic 
SRVLWLRQRIWKHWUDQVLWLRQ¶V liberal consensus which had been wearing away during the 2000s, and which 
had been severely attacked by the February protest. Steered by the liberal intellectuals of the transition, 
dLVFRXUVHVSHUWDLQLQJWRERWKWKHFRQVHQVXV¶ negative and positive definitions, i.e. anti-communism and 
neoliberalism respectively, were abundant in the language of the Summer protest, and appeared to 
attempt to gain whatever ground had been lost to what they saw as WKH³SRSXOLVWV´ aQG³FRPPXQLVWV´ of 
February. Thus, the conflicting visions espoused in February and Summer 2013, which involved a host 
of contentions such as whether nationalising or liberalising the HQHUJ\PDUNHWFRQVWLWXWHGµJRRGVHQVH¶
and whether direct or representative democracy is a better form of governance, clashed in a bid for 
KHJHPRQ\RYHUWKHµFRPPRQVHQVH¶RIWKHZKROHRIVRFLHW\LHLQDELGIRUKHJHPRQ\ 7KHµDSSOHRI
FRQWHQWLRQ¶ZKLch forged the specific divisions among protesters in 2013 was the right to represent civil 
society which would ultimately grant one the right to impose a particular vision for social change, since 
D KHJHPRQLF SRVLWLRQ ZLWKLQ FLYLO VRFLHW\ HQWDLOV RQH¶V YLVion for social transformation acquiring 
hegemonic character. 
These struggles, however, pushed political actors to attempt to adapt to the increasingly contentious 
ideological environment, as well as to the non-partisan identifications of protesters: both waves claimed 
WKHLUV ZDV FLWL]HQV¶FLYLO VRFLHW\¶V protests and did not let party symbols or flags to crop up on the 
demonstrations. The disenchantment with traditional political party identifications is of course not a new 
phenomenon ± augmented by the post-Cold War liberal-capitalist consensus, the traditional left-right 
divisions in Eastern Europe have been dissipating since the early 2000s when we witnessed the 
emergence of what Hanley and Sikk (2014) called anti-establishment parties. For many of these, as well 
as for any new-FRPHUVKRZHYHULWQRZVHHPVQHFHVVDU\WRDSSHDUDVµUHSUHVHQWLQJFLYLOVRFLHW\¶%HORZ
                                                          
i dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƵƐƵĂůůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ ‘cŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇƐŚŽƵƚĞĚ ‘red scum ?
on protest demonstrations. 
ii For example, Asen Genov, one of the most famous activist-protester wrote:  
February ǁĂƐƚŚĞƉŽŽƌ ?Ɛprotest, whereas now it is the protest of people who have promising futures, who lead 
independent lives. The February protest was for privileges, now it is for rights.  Back then they wanted lower 
electricity prices, or in general terms  ? they wanted priviůĞŐĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŶŽǁƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ? ?
(Genov 2013) 
iii  ‘ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĨŽƌƵůŐĂƌŝĂŶZĞǀŝǀĂů ?ƐƉůŝƚŽĨĨƚŚĞƵůŐĂƌŝĂŶ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚWĂƌƚǇĂƚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? 
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I briefly review four of the newly-emerged political parties in Bulgaria in the aftermath of the protests, 
all of which seemed WREHDWWHPSWLQJVXFKDPDQRHXYUHLHVWDNLQJDFODLPRQµFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ 
Post-SROLWLFDOIRUPDWLRQVSDUWLHVRIWKHµSHRSOH¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\¶DQGSDUWLHVRIWKHµPLGGOH
FODVVHV¶FLYLOVRFLHW\¶ 
A month after the February protests, some of the most active protesters who appeared most often on 
media and were widely perceived as its leaders (despite themselves rejecting the label) broke their 
SOHGJHWRQHYHUHQWHUWKHSROLWLFDODUHQDDVDSDUW\DQGWKHLUPRYHPHQWFDOOHGµMovement for Civic 
Control¶participated in the interim parliamentary elections in May 2013 as part of a political party ± 
µDemocratic Civic Initiative¶i :LWK WKH PRWWR µCivic Control - That is You¶ LW FODLPHG WR EH ³the 
mandatary of the protest´ (Fileva 2013) and to represent the ³DZDNHQ FLYLF FRQVFLRXVQHVV´ of the 
Bulgarian people. The candidate MPs selection procedure reflected their pledge and is illustrative of 
their popular will subjectivity: candidate-03VZHUHWREHVHOHFWHG³VWUDLJKWIURPWKHVWUHHW´the latter 
were to also VLJQ D µdeclaration for honest political behaviour¶ii, a symbolic act which echoes the 
revolutionary, moral-nationalist and highly charged rhetoric of the February protests. The party was 
short-lived as it failed to secure any seats in the elections, but tKHPRYHPHQW µ0RYHPHQW IRU&LYLF
&RQWURO¶LVVWLOODFWLYHNHHSLQJWKHGHEDWHDERXWFRUUXSWLRQLQWKHHQHUJ\VHFWRULQ%XOJDULDDQGDERXW
the problems of representative democracy animated, albeit nowhere near as intense and now mostly only 
on the internet. 
Another new party ± µBulgaria without Censorship¶± also emerged after the February mobilizations. It 
was headed by a former TV-host Nikolay Barekov who began a generous campaign of promises such 
as to get unemployment down to 0% and to provide a tablet for every schoolchild (Mladenova 2014). 
+HDOVRYRZHG³WRZRUNIRUFDSLWDOLVPDQGPDUNHWHFRQRP\ZLWKDKXPDQIDFH´DQGFODLPHGWR³GHVLUH
UHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGXQLILFDWLRQIRUWKH%XOJDULDQQDWLRQ´ (ibid.), in this way skilfully combining liberal 
and nationalist elements in a bid to reproduce the hybrid subject articulations of the winter protesters 
(but also seemingly desiring to capture the pro-capitalist sentiments of some of the summer protesters). 
He fXUWKHUSOHGJHG WKDW ³DOO SROLWLFLDQVZKRKDYHEURNHQ WKH ODZZLOO OLH LQSULVRQ´ (ibid.), vividly 
echoing the chants of the February protest crowd. He also pledged to fulfil this promise by carrying out 
DQµ2SHUDWLRQ&OHDQ+DQGV¶± the label used by some of the summer protesters to refer to a demand to 
audit the income and property possessions of the Bulgarian political class of the transition. In this way, 
Barekov clearly attempted to present his political project as representing civil society in all its 
articulations ± ERWKWKHµSHRSOH¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\¶RIWKHWinter and the elitist middle-FODVV¶FLYLOVRFLHW\
of the Summer. At the same time, he was allegedly financially supported by major businesses and linked 
to controversial figures, including Delyan Peevski (the media mogul whose appointment triggered the 
summer protests), which eventually dealt a blow to %DUHNRY¶V political project which is now collapsing. 
In the words of Vasil Garnizov (2014), a social anthropologist and protester in the Summer: 
«>%@DUHNRY¶VSUREOHPLVWKDWWKHGLVFRQWHQWHG>RIthe February protests] do not recognize him 
[as their representative], and the active [summer] protesters openly mock him as a face and a 
mask of the status-quo. 
Another new political party which emerged from the protests of 2013 was DEOS, which was registered 
in the summer of 2014. 7KHSDUW\GHVFULEHVLWVHOIDVD³SROLWLFDOVXEMHFWZKLFKGRHVQRWILWWKHVWDQGDUG
[political] frames and terms. We lay the beginnings of a new type of politics, which banks on active 
civic participation and bottom-XSLQLWLDWLYH´ (DEOSa n.d.). Its stated priorities are: the enforcement of 
                                                          
i Instead of registering an entirely new party, protesters used the legal registration of an existing marginal one 
 ?  ‘ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝǀŝĐ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?
ii  “We realise that just a signature is not adequate guarantee for morale, but we will make sure that if someone 
screws up, it would be hard for theŵƚŽŐŽŽƵƚŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞĞƚ ?ƐŝĐ ? ? ?&ŝůĞǀĂ ? ? ? ? ? 
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ODZVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWDQGHGXFDWLRQLELG LWV VWDWHGPLVVLRQ LV³WRZRUNDFWLYHO\ WRPDNH
Bulgaria a well-run state [where] the rule of law is [strong], in which we all develop [ourselves] freely 
in the conditions of democracy, pluralism, market economy and Euro-$WODQWLFRULHQWDWLRQ´'(26b 
n.d.). As Tsoneva and Medarov (n.d.) note, its structure, language and practices conspicuously borrow 
from the project management and entrepreneurial orders of discourse (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
1999) of the NGO and business spheres: for example, the people behind the party insist on calling 
'(26DµSURMHFW¶UDWKHUWKDQDSDUW\. Its ethos further disavows representation and explicit leadership 
and reflects a post-anarchist direct democratic principle (Tsoneva and Medarov n.d.). Its  members also 
articulate a µSURGXFWLYHDQGSUR-DFWLYH¶VXEMHFWLYLW\HFKRLQJWKHVXPPHUSURWHVWHUV¶VXEMHFWSRVLWLRQLQJ
as the disgruntled productive, tax- and bills- paying middle class. DEOS are still a small and somewhat 
marginal political formation, but seems to be growing and gaining popularity amongst young liberal 
circles in Sofia. 
At the height of the summer protest yet another new political formation emerged, calling itself The 
Reform Bloc, and FODLPLQJWRUHSUHVHQWµWKHDXWKHQWLF¶FLYLOVRFLHW\RIWKHOLEHUDOSUR-EU middle class. 
It was set up as a coalition of five (previously existing) parties positioned to the right of the political 
VSHFWUXP$SDUWIURPWKHSDUWLHVLQWKH%ORFDERG\FDOOHGµFLWL]HQFRXQFLO¶ZDVDOVRVHWXSWRLQFOXGH
µFLWL]HQV¶ unaffiliated with the party. The Bloc also built a close working relationship with formal civil 
society organizations, particularly those supportive of and active in the Summer protest (such as µ3URtest 
1HWZRUN¶i). The rhetoric of the Bloc did not seem to reflect any of the concerns and language of the 
WLQWHUSURWHVW,QFRQWUDVWLWPLUURUHGWKHµUDWLRQDO¶anti-communist, pro-EU and pro-morale concerns 
DQGUKHWRULFRIWKHµIUXVWUDWHGPLGGOHFODVV¶WRXVH*UHVNRYLWV>@DQG.UDVWHY¶V>2007] term) who 
marched in the Summer of 2013. A new coalition of already-established parties, the Reform Bloc can 
be seen as highly illustrative of the tendency for political parties to (need to) re-articulate themselves in 
a new Gestalt to meet the exigency of the new ideological environment. The political parties which 
formed the Bloc are mostly the parties to the right of the political spectrum which survived in a separate 
form after the dissolution of the bi-polar political model of the 1990sii, and specifically the political 
fragments left after the disintegration of the United Democratic Forces [UDF], which was one of the 
two main political parties of the 1990s. The formation of the Bloc was celebrated by its supporters as 
the µUH-)unification of the right-KDQG¶. It is reasonable to argue that such a re-unification was effectively 
the response of the liberal-capitalist subjectivity under attack from the newly articulated popular-
democratic wide coalition of political discontent (in February).  
Since the early 2000s, the liberal-capitalist consensus has been challenged by parties widely perceived 
DVSRSXOLVW µDQWL-establLVKPHQW¶ VXFKDV6LPHRQ Saxe-Coburg-Gotha¶VPRYHPHQW focused on anti-
corruption (in government  2001-2005), Volen 6LGHURY¶VIDU-right µAtaka¶, and %RLNR%RULVRY¶VGERB 
(in government 2009-2013), but only in rhetoric: despite their µpopulist¶ promises, all of these 
persistently pushed (neo-)liberal policies , or as Krastev (2007) summarises, governments changed but 
their policies remained the same:LWKWKHFKDOOHQJHWKLVWLPHµIURPEHORZ¶LQ)HEUXDU\KRZHYHU
WKHµULJKW-KDQG¶FRXOGQRORQJHUDIIRUGWREHµGLYLGHG¶LQVPDOOHUSDUWLHV± it had to reunite as a coherent 
political agent capable of withstanding the threat coming from what they saw as mobs seduced by 
FRPPXQLVPDQGSRSXOLVPZKRDUWLFXODWHGWKHK\EULGSROLWLFDOVXEMHFWLYLW\RIDµSHRSOH¶VFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ 
in February. What is more, this re-unification had to be articulated in terms that would allow the 
SURWHVWLQJµPLGGOHFODVV¶RIWKHsummer to recognize them as their political representative; hence the 
                                                          
i An organization composed of the most active protesters of the Summer. 
ii During the 1990s the Bulgarian political system was essentially bi-polar  ? with the United Democratic Forces 
(UDF) and BSP as the main players  ? until 2001 when this model was destroyed with the entry of a new 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŚĞĂĚĞĚďǇƵůŐĂƌŝĂ ?ƐĞǆ-czar Simeon Saxe-Coburg-'ŽƚŚĂ ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ‘ĂŶƚŝ-
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƉĂƌƚǇǁŚŝĐŚĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŽŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞƚŚe old left-right divisions and to work for the eradication of 
corruption, effectively  sustaining the liberal consensus established before its arrival. 
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need to articulate µThe Reform Bloc¶ as not only yet another party to represent civil society, but one 
WKDWUHSUHVHQWVµDXWKHQWLFFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ 
 µ3RVLWLRQLQJ¶DQGµPDQRHXYULQJ¶KHJemonic struggles at the intersection between civil society 
and party politics  
The hegemonic struggles we have observed in Bulgaria in 2013 then can be seen as reflecting changed 
socio-political divisions twenty-plus years after the fall of the socialisWUHJLPH7KHV¶VORJDQµFLYLO
VRFLHW\DJDLQVWWKHVWDWH¶KDVnow given way to a different kind of struggle: one that no longer pits a 
homogenous civil society against the state, but a struggle which seeks to re-constitutes class-based 
political articulations within civil society, which are consequently utilized in a bid to take control of state 
power. To understand the struggles within such a conceptual framework, would be to grasp the language 
and practices of both protest movements and political parties by matching their political tactics with the 
conditions in which they operate and the goals they pursue, i.e. apprehending the specific type of 
political conjuncture in which they function.  
These two protest waves then QHHGWREHVHHQDVSDUWRIWKHµRUJDQLFFULVHV¶VHWRIILQWKHIRUPHUsocialist 
VWDWHVLQ8WLOL]LQJDQRWKHU*UDPVFLDQFRQFHSWWKH%XOJDULDQµUHYROXWLRQ¶RIFDQEHVHHQDV
Dµpassive revolution¶LQWKDWLWZDVH[WHUQDOO\EURXJKWDERXWIROORZLQJ*RUEDFKHY¶Vperestroika) and 
elite-engineered: there was at the time no attempt to drive popular support and change the world-view 
WKH µFRPPRQ VHQVH¶ RI WKH µPDVVHV¶ LH WR HVWDEOLVK SROLWLFDO DQG FXOWXUDO KHJHPRQ\ EHIRUH WKH
WRSSOLQJRIWKHUHJLPH,QVWHDGLWZDVDUHYROXWLRQµIURPDERYH¶WRZKLFKWKHJUHDWPDMRULW\VLPSO\
acquiesced. The decade which followed involved intense attempts to establish such political and cultural 
KHJHPRQ\RIWKHWUDQVLWLRQ¶V OLEHUDOFRQVHQVXVNH\WRZKLFKZHUHWKHµSURMHFWV¶RIde-communisation 
(or purging of the µburden¶ of the totalitarian past) and modernization (or catching up with the West on 
a course to a liberal democratic future). The (neo-)liberal ideas of privatization, liberalization and 
deregulation achieved a seemingly hegemonic character under the reform government of the United 
Democratic Forces (UDF) between 1997-2001. At the beginning of the 2000s, however, a multiplicity 
of competing discourses began to emerge. The previously hegemonic discourses of de-communisation, 
liberal democracy and free market economy became increasingly fragmented and contested by the new 
discourses of populism, nationalism and, most recently, anti-austerity. It can be argued that during the 
2000s then we witnessed the decline of a hegemonic discourse (which had temporarily functioned as a 
VRFLDOLPDJLQDU\DVD³KRUL]RQ´>/DFODX@LQWRDGLVFRXUVHRQFHDJDLQVWUXJJOLQJIRUKHJHPRQ\
³DP\WKLFDOVSDFHZKLFKVWULYHVWRVXUYLYHLQWKHSROLWLFDODUHQD´dHOLN7KLVLGHRORJLFDO
fragmentation transpired gradually during the late 2000s and, augmented by the global economic crisis 
set off in 2007, culminated in the protest mobilizations of 2013. 
In other words, following a gradual corrosion since early 2000s and a severe challenge in the face of the 
2007 global economic meltdown, the post-1989 liberal-capitalist LPDJLQDU\ µKRUL]RQ¶ UHFHLYHG D
bottom-up attack in the form of the two protest mobilizations of 2013. In the context of such a political 
conjuncture, the two protest waves and the formation of new political parties claiming to represent them, 
point to two main inferences. The political mobilizations constituted a sort of war of position, whereby 
the struggle was waged over how a desired new social order ± DQHZµFRQVHQVXV¶± would be constituted. 
.H\ WR WKHVH µSRVLWLRQLQJ¶ VWUXJJOHV LV WKH FRPSHWLWLRQ EHWZHHQ GLIIHUHQW VRFLDO JURXSV¶ GLYHUJHQW
definitions of problems and proposals for solutions. The stake is a hegemonic status for the respective 
political project that would grant the socLDOFODVVDGYDQFLQJLWWKHDELOLW\WRODXQFKDµZDURIPDQRHXYUH¶
DJDLQVWWKHVWDWHLHHQJDJHLQDSROLWLFDOVWUXJJOHIRUVWDWHSRZHU7KHVHµSRVLWLRQLQJ¶VWUXJJOHVZHUH
fought on the terrain of civil society in a bottom-up manner: both civic movements preceded the 
formation of the political organizations which claimed to represent them. From this follows the second 
inference I draw: in the context of a liberal institutional arrangement more than two decades after 1989, 
civil society is no longer the homogenous entity imagined shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. With 
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the growing heterogeneity of post-socialist civil society, facilitated by the dissolution of the liberal 
consensus, the importance of political struggles on the arena of civil society has increased tremendously; 
that is, increasingly, struggles for hegemony in the region need to be played out first and foremost on 
the terrain of civil society, before they can be transferred onto the arena of formal politicsi. In other 
words, gaining legitimacy vis-á-vis civil society E\ ZD\ RI EXLOGLQJ DQ LGHQWLW\ RI µFLYLO VRFLHW\
representatives¶ appears to have become critical for political projects striving for political leadership in 
the post-socialist region. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the turbulent events in Bulgaria in 2013 demonstrate a radically transformed political dynamic 
twenty-plus years after 1989. The WUDQVLWLRQ¶V liberal consensus saw in February 2013 the most severe 
challenge up to date in the country.  Importantly, the challenge emerged in a bottom-up manner, as an 
outbreak of the insurrectionary energies of the disenchanted subaltern classes, or the oppressed and 
marginalised sections of society, who articulated a hybrid SROLWLFDO VXEMHFWLYLW\ RI D µSHRSOH¶V FLYLO
socieW\¶ LPEULFDWLQJ WKHQDWLRQDO-popular with the liberal. The liberal intellectuals RI WKHµWUDQVLWLRQ¶ 
contemptuously diVPLVVHGWKHPDVµ)HEUXDU\PREVseduced by communism and populism¶. To be able 
to withstand the threat coming from such counter-hegemonic subalterns, the same liberal intellectuals 
then rushed to seize upon the June wave of protests, and attempted to channel WKHODWWHU¶Venergies in an 
anti-communist and pro-neoliberal direction. This top-down µFRXQWHU-counter-KHJHPRQLF¶intervention 
by intellectuals FDSWXUHGWKHSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFLPDJLQDWLRQRI6RILD¶VDVSLULQJPLGGOH-class, and 
carved out a class-based fissure within the civil society body. Amid these hegemonic struggles on the 
arena of civil society, several new political projects emerged, four of which I discussed above. Two of 
these ± 'HPRFUDWLF &LWL]HQ¶V ,QLWLDWLYH and Bulgaria Without Censorship ± attempted to capitalize 
mostly on the radical national-popular insurgency of February, whereas the other two ± the DEOS 
project and the Reform Bloc ± sought to represent specifically the voice of those who desired an 
µHYROXWLRQDU\UHIRUP¶DFRPSOHWLRQRIWKHOLEHUDOWUDQVLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQLWVXQGRLQJ Significantly, the 
SROLWLFDOµPDQRHXYULQJ¶RIWKHVHQHZSROLWLFDODFWRUV no longer takes place in isolation from what was 
ORQJSHUFHLYHGDVDµZHDN¶FLYLOVRFLHW\LQ the region (Howarth 2003). Instead, political manoeuvres in 
the region today seem to be increasingly pressed to draw their very legitimacy from civil society, which 














                                                          
i dŚƵƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŝŶŐŽŶĞŽĨ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐŬĞǇ arguments: that within the liberal capitalist states of 20th century 
Western Europe, a rising revolutionary class would necessarily have to first ĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚ “ƚŚĞƚƌĞŶĐŚĞƐŽĨĐŝǀŝů
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇƚŚĞďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐŝĞ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŝƚĐŽƵůĚůĂƵŶĐŚĂƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ‘ǁĂƌŽĨŵĂŶŽĞƵǀƌĞ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ
ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞƉŽǁĞƌ ? 
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